Tuesday, December 09, 2008

Policy Quarterly: the problem of international ‘burden sharing’

Here are some links (see below) to interesting articles on the problem of international burden sharing from Policy Quarterly including one from Ross Garnaut (of Garnaut Report fame).

.

Here is the editor (Jonathon Boston) of Policy Quarterly explaining the articles from the current issue where he provides "a brief account of the central problem that the contributors all seek to address".

.

"Negotiations are currently underway to secure a new international agreement on climate change to take effect when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Undoubtedly, the biggest stumbling block for any new multilateral agreement is the sharp disagreement over how to share the costs of mitigation and adaptation. The difficulties are multiple, complex and overlapping.

First, policy measures to reduce emissions will almost certainly impose short-term economic costs on those nations taking them, but the benefits that accrue will be enjoyed by all countries regardless of their contribution. There is thus an incentive for each country to minimize its cost-bearing obligations while relying on others to do more.

Second, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), negotiated in 1992, embraces the principle that countries should contribute to the challenges posed by climate change ‘in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’. But the precise meaning of this principle is unclear. Indeed, many different (and competing) principles of justice can be advanced to inform the issue of how responsibilities should be fairly differentiated. And this means that what constitutes a fair or just sharing of the burden (or ‘effort’) of mitigating and/or adapting to climate change will depend on which of the suggested principles is embraced and how they are weighted. Unfortunately, therefore, all burden sharing formulas are open to the accusation that they are unfair in some important respect.

Third, under the UNFCCC, countries are divided into two main categories – Annex 1 (i.e. industrialized countries) and non-Annex 1 (i.e. developing countries). Annex 1 countries, understandably, are expected to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But in recent years, the emissions of some large emerging economies, like China and India, have grown rapidly. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that if substantial temperature increases are to be avoided later this century and beyond, global emissions will need to be cut by at least 50% by 2050 (i.e. compared with levels in 1990). This will require massive reductions by most Annex 1 countries (e.g. 80% or more), but also significant cuts by some developing countries.
.
Unsurprisingly, few countries are yet willing to face this prospect.

Fourth, aside from principles of justice, there are various other considerations which impinge on the question of how the burdens of mitigation and adaptation should be shared. These include the availability of technologies to reduce particular types of emissions, the rate of population growth, the imperative of poverty eradication, and the limited capacity of many developing countries at present to quantify their emissions in a reliable and verifiable manner. Again, any conclusions about burden sharing will depend on which of these considerations is taken into account and what weighting they are given.
.
Fifth, and related to this, there is a natural incentive for each of the key participants (and groups of participants with common interests) to emphasize those principles and considerations that minimize their expected contribution to the global mitigation effort. Many countries are also likely to claim that they face unique, or at least special, circumstances which make it particularly costly or inappropriate for them to take strenuous action to curb their emissions. And while it might be preferable for matters of principle to prevail over narrow conceptions of national self-interest, considerations of realpolitik cannot be eliminated from the equation – as highlighted by the outcome of the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, and the effort-sharing arrangements agreed to within the European Union in recent years. Inevitably, all this will complicate efforts to reach an international consensus.

Given these various disagreements and constraints, will it be possible to cut a post-2012 deal?
.
Maybe. But informed observers doubt that a fully-fledged agreement will be negotiated by the end of 2009 – the current target date set by the UN. That said, many are hopeful that a workable deal will be struck during 2010.

In all likelihood, much will depend on the negotiating position adopted by the US, and this in turn will be influenced by the outcome of the presidential and congressional elections in November.
The current global financial crisis may also play a role – but probably not a helpful one.

Yet for the sake of future generations of humanity and our planet’s many and varied species, every effort must be made to find a satisfactory way forward – one that is environmentally effective, economically efficient and acceptably fair."

Jonathan Boston
.
Links:
.
.
.
.
.
If you enjoyed this post, please also check out:
.
.
.

No comments: